This paper explores the trade-o between economic growth and environmental quality along two paradigms of endogenous growth theory: variety expansion HIP and quality improvements VIP. We compare the policies that match the decentralized economies' paths with the optimal strong sustainable growth path, characterized by growth in consumption and improvements in environmental quality. Three policy tools are employed: subsidies to monopolists and R&D, and taxes on emissions. The later is increasing at the optimum, to keep the weight of tax revenues over output constant. All policy tools equal, the growth rate is higher in the VIP than in the HIP. The optimal subsidy to R&D is therefore greater and the cumulative l o o s i n output smaller under HIP than the VIP.
1 Introduction.
The recent e n vironmental policy agenda has focused on the need to control emissions of green-house gases. Prospects for sustained economic growth are challenged by these environmental constraints. Technologies have t o b e adjusted substantially to make e n vironmental and economic growth targets compatible.
Economic theory has characterized the case of global pollution by the two-fold role of the environment 1 . On the one hand, environmental quality a ects utility of the representative agent as a non-rival good. On the other hand, production exploits rival services from the environment sink for waste and emissions. In this respect it represents a renewable resource, that assimilates waste according to its own laws, not subject to human manipulation. The public nature of the environment justi es public intervention either through regulation of technological standards, or through some pricing mechanism for emissions taxes or tradeable permits. This paper explores the issue within the two main paradigms of growth theory that endogenize technological change through research and development activities.
Stokey 1998 proposes a useful framework of analysis, where emissions are an input to production. Within this framework, an AK economy cannot develop along a trajectory of sustainable growth. This is because as environmental standards are improved, the marginal product of capital is reduced. Whereas if labor productivity grows at an exogenous rate, the marginal product of capital may b e k ept high enough to induce continuous investment. In this case, the economy m a y follow a path of strong sustainable growth, that is one where consumption and environmental quality increase simultaneously. Building on Stokey's framework, Aghion and Howitt 1998 endogenize the rate of productivity growth in an aggregate version of the schumpeterian models of growth, to show that with this approach strong sustainable growth might be optimal. This model is reviewed in section 2.
In this paper we present t w o di erent approaches to decentralize the Aghion-Howitt economy. Section 3 introduces the disaggregated structure of these economies. The rst one referes to the theory of endogenous growth through horizontal innovations, introduced by Romer 1990 . The second one builds on the theory of endogenous growth through vertical innovations, developped by Grossman and Helpman 1991 and Howitt 1992. In sections 4 and 5 we analyse the decentralized versions of the models. Three policy tools are introduced into the economy, in order to correct for the distortions present in these economies: a subsidy to monopolies to correct for market power; a subsidy to R&D to match social and private returns to this activity; and a tax on emissions of pollutants to price this input. 2 One virtue of the schumpeterian approach is that it allows us to highlight the channels through which e n vironmental policy a ects medium to long term growth. This analysis is undertaken in section 6, where we compare the equilibrium outcomes in the two paradigms of growth, and present the trade-o between economic growth and environmental quality. In section 7 we c haracterize the optimal policy that matches the decentralized paths of growth with the optimal sustainable path. Conclusions are contained in the last section.
A recent strand of literature has explored environmental policy in endogenous growth models with horizontal innovations. Elbasha and Roe 1996 , Hung, Chang and Blackburn 1993 , and Verdier 1993 study the case where the ow of emissions a ects utility, and intermediary inputs are di erentiated according to their intensity in pollution. They all analyse market equilibria and compare them with social optima. Hung, Chang and Blackburn 1993 and Verdier 1993 nd that at equilibrium the economy might e v en growth slower that at the optimum. Byrne 1997 considers a framework close to an aggregate schumpeterian model to characterize the rst best growth rates of output and pollution, and compare them to two second-best alternatives. Her model abstracts from capital accumulation, does not analyse incentives to invest in R&D, and postulates the links between production and environmental quality in a di erent w a y than us. However none of these works implements explicitly the optimal policy.
2 Optimal Sustainable Growth. Aghion and Howitt 1998 analyse the pollution-production relationship in an aggregate economy along the following lines.
Final output is produced according to :
Y t = z t D t 1 , n t Proposition 1 Aghion-Howitt, 1998 There exists an optimal sustainable growth path if: a the discount rate is lower than the potential rate of growth of knowledge:
b the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is lower than unity: 1 " 1 c the natural rate of pollution assimilation is high enough:
" , 1 , Assumption a is usual for endogenous growth to be optimal. We will basically restrict the analysis to the case of assumption b, although it is quite restrictive. Its role is crucial and this will become clear when we will study the decentralized equilibria in section 5. Assumption c is more technical, and is necessary to ensure that the initial level of K is positive.
Few comments are worthwhile. First knowledge is accumulated at a faster rate than physical capital g o D g o K , because knowledge accumulation has to counter both decreasing returns to investment which require at least g D = g K , and the depressing e ect of environmental restrictions g o z 0 on the productivity of capital. Second, the lower the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the smaller the optimal growth rate, thus the lower the opportunity cost of environmental policy, or equivalently the greater the social return to investment i n e n vironmental quality , S . This suggests that the scope for optimality of the sustainable path is enlarged when there are complementarities between consumption and environmental quality in the utility function, and viceversa is reduced when there is substitution see Michel and Rotillon, 1996. Third, along This section introduces two modi ed models of endogenous growth theory. The rst one extends the model economy o f P aul Romer 1990 , where R&D fosters growth by increasing the variety o f i n termediate goods, to include pollution inputs. The second builds on the models of Grossman and Helpman 1991 and Howitt 1992 , where R&D targets directly productivity improvements over a nite space of intermediate goods. 5 Implicit abatement expenditure is = 1 , z D1,n 1, K = 1 , z y , and pollution P = y , 1+ y , . T h us, at any level of potential output, y, w e h a v e @P=@ 0 and @ 2 P=@ 2 0, as long as 0 . W e thank Sjak Smulders for his comments on this point.
The goods of the two economies are the same as in section 2. However the level of technology, D, i s i n terpreted di erently in the two models. It will be shown that at the optimum the two economies are described by the aggregate economy presented in the previous section.
3.1 The Horizontal Innovation Paradigm.
In the horizontal innovations paradigm hereafter HIP the production function of the representative nal sector rm is :
Y t = z t 1 , n t Here A jt is the productivity index for good j at date t and therefore ex-ante is a random variable. Let us also de ne the average productivity index as A t = R 1 0 A jt dj. R&D rms specialize on one good j and employ labor in a stochastic production function, governed by a P oisson process with instantaneous arrival parameter equal across sectors. When an innovation is obtained the highest productivity present on the market, denoted by A t max j fA jt g, is applied to the new generation of good j. This feature captures the intertemporal spillover e ect of R&D over the state of general knowledge. Indeed, each innovation increases marginally general knowledge, a non-rival non-excludable asset, which allows other R&D rms to implement e v er larger improvements in productivity i.e. the spillover a ects the size of innovations.
The Poisson arrival rate in sector j at date t is assumed to be n jt , for simplicity and coherence with previous settings. Therefore the instantaneous ow of innovations in the economy as a whole is just n t . Moreover we suppose that the state of knowledge proxied by A increases at a rate proportional to the ow of innovations, according to a spillover coe cient 0 :
where we h a v e de ned . Finally to obtain full compatibility b e t w een this disaggregated economy and the aggregate economy in section 2, we assume that R&D intesity i.e. the n jt 's is uniform across sectors.
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The production function of the intermediate good j 2 0; 1 is now assumed to be :
More productive goods are hence more capital intensive. Aggregate capital is :
A jt x jt dj 3.3 Optimal aggregation.
In both models the environment and preferences are modeled by 3, 4, 5, and 8 as in section 2.
Proposition 2 At steady state these two disaggregated e c onomies are c ompatible with the aggregate economy considered b y A ghion and Howitt. That is, their optimal aggregate production functions coincide with 1, and, for n constant, the laws of motion of productivity indexes B for the HIP and A for the VIP are e qual to 7. Therefore they share the same optimal balanced growth path.
Proof. see appendix II.
4 The decentralized economies.
It is assumed that, in both economies, there are a competitive nal sector, a competitive R&D sector, perfect markets for capital and labor, and monopolized markets for intermediate goods.
The price of the nal good is normalized to unity, w denotes the wage rate, r the rental rate of capital, and p j the price of intermediate good j. T o cope with the three distortions present in these economies, we i n troduce three policy tools :
a tax h levied on the nal sector to price pollution emissions inputs; a subsidy to capital income, , to correct for market power; a subsidy to R&D, , to match private and public returns to R&D.
The nal sector.
The pro t function of the representative competitive nal sector rm is : t = z t 1 , n t Notice that green taxes, h, depress demand for all inputs in both models.
However, while demand is uniform across sectors in the HIP, i t i s s k ewed towards more productive hence most recent intermediate goods. the rate of return on alternative placements but also by the probability o f survival, because the arrival of an innovation on the same sector makes the incumbent patent obsolete and its value nil. Pro ts of an innovator depend on the productivity applied to the innovation, and this is A t independently of the sector j where the innovation is implemented. Since also the cost of labor is common to all sectors, the equilibrium level of R&D will be uniform across sectors.
The intermediate goods sector.

Consumers and the government.
Consumers maximize their discounted ow of utility, given by 8, subject to their intertemporal budget constraint. The latter can be summarized by the instantaneous law of accumulation of assets, W : _ W t = w t + r t W t , c t , T t where T are lump-sum taxes together with the no-Ponzi game condition :
Since pollution is a non-rival bad and it is assumed that consumers have no direct instruments to control it, the representative consumer problem is solved by the usual Ramsey rule : _ c t c t = r t ,
Finally the government m ust respect its own intertemporal budget constraint. To be simple, but without loss of generality, w e assume that the government k eeps the budget balanced through lump-sum taxes or transfers to households, T. Then the government budget constraint is represented by the equality b e t w een tax revenues and subsidy expenditure :
T t + h t P t = t r t K t + t w t n t 29 5 Green Regime Balanced Growth.
Along a balanced growth path all variables grow at constant rates and r, n, and are constant.
The Horizontal Innovations Paradigm.
The value of an innovation arrived at date t can be computed using 20 and 21 to substitute for in the integral of 25, and is : 1 is obtained by substituting z from condition 15 under the green regime. The numerator is the initial at date t instantaneous pro t, and is decreasing in the level of the green tax rate and the net cost of capital. The denominator includes the discount rate r, i.e. the rate of return on alternative placements, and the rate of growth of green taxes, because these crowd out pro ts by depressing demand for intermediate goods.
We call this e ect the green crowding-out.
For a balanced growth path to exist it is necessary that :
This is the dynamic version of the R&D arbitrage condition, which m ust hold for n to be constant 7 . It states that whenever the green tax rate is increasing, knowledge accumulation must proceed faster than capital accumulation i.e. same rate as output growth along a BGP. This is because g h 0 implies by 15 a reduction in z, and thus a faster decline in the productivity of capital than otherwise. As a result in order to keep the marginal product of capital constant, knowledge accumulation must compensate for both decreasing returns to capital and the adoption of increasingly cleaner but less productive techniques.
To determine the equilibrium interest rate during the green regime we have to simplify the R&D arbitrage condition. Write initial pro ts as function of initial sales, x t , then substitute labor demand from the nal sector with 16 and z by 15, nally substitute forx and simplify the R&D arbitrage condition to obtain : r + g h 1 , = 1 , n 1 , then substitute for n using 12, 28 and 31: n = g B = = r , = " + g h = 1 , . Gather all terms in r to obtain : r e = " "1 , + + " , + 1 , g h 1 ,
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The rst term in the denominator is generated by the discount rate, the second by the initial level of pro ts. In brackets on the numerator we h a v e the rst three terms which re ect inital pro ts, and the last term generated by the green crowding-out e ect. The equilibrium level of R&D employment can be directly derived using again 12, 28 and 31, and is : n e = 1 "1 , + , 1 , + " , 11 , g h = 1 ,
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Notice that for " 1 the equilibrium level of R&D is increasing in the rate of growth of green taxes. To i n terpret this result remember that in the overlapping generations model of growth when " 1 a reduction in the rate of interest increases the saving rate because the income e ect dominates the substitution e ect. In our model, n represent s a s a ving rate too, because it increases future output through knowledge accumulation by foregoing present consumption. Then an increasing path of green tax rates here reduces the equilibrium return to savings and therefore fosters investment when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is smaller than unity " 1 .
Proposition 3 Proof. Remark: i t i s w orth mentioning that, if " 1 and =
, there exists an environmental policy leading to negative growth with positive levels of R&D activity. Indeed a policy satis ng :
, " , 1 g h 1 , 1 + + =" implies n e 2 0; 1 and 0 r e .
The Vertical Innovations Paradigm.
Along a balanced growth path the cross sectoral distribution of relative to the leading edge productivity parameters is constant. This is an important property since it allows us to compute average and aggregate values of variables by switching the space of integration from that of nominal sectors j is the name of a sector to that of relative productivity see appendix II for details. We can evaluate the average productivity A t and show that it is proportional to the leading edge productivity :
A t = A t 1 + so that g A = g
A . Since equilibrium production of intermediate goods,x, is uniform across sectors, using the de nition of aggregate capital we can write : The numerator is the initial instantaneous pro t of an innovator, and is increasing in the level of general knowledge and decreasing in the level of green taxes and the net cost of capital. The denominator shows as before the discount and the green crowding-out rates, plus a new e ect called creative destruction or business stealing, speci c to the vertical innovation paradigm.
Along a balanced growth path for the dynamic version of the R&D arbitrage condition to hold it is necessary that :
since wages grow at the same pace of output. Notice that, although the arbitrage conditions di er in the two models, this dynamic constraint for balanced growth is equivalent to condition 31 for the HIP.
The equilibrium interest rate is determined using the same procedure as before, and is There are two kinds of di erences with respect to the HIP. First, all terms derived from the initial level of pro ts i.e. the second term in the denominator and the rst three terms in brackets are now compounded by the factor 1+= 1. This is because while in the HIP pro ts are uniform across sectors, in this setting demand is skewed towards most productive goods and therefore the initial pro t of innovators is greater. Second, three new terms generated by the creative destruction e ect appear: the third term in the denominator and the last two terms in brakets. Notice that a positive g h now l o w ers the equilibrium interest rate through this additional channel.
The equilibrium level of R&D activity can be derived as in the HIP case, and is : Proof. , but g h g h 8 2 0; 1.
Instead if " 1 , n e 1 is trivially satis ed.
As in the HIP there can be a con guration of parameters such that environmental policy can lead to negative growth, although the economy i s engaged in R&D activity.
It is also interesting to notice that growth may be positive at equilibrium, even when this is not optimal. Indeed, the condition for equilibrium growth, = 1+ might be satis ed even when the one for optimality is not, = 1. T o understand this possibility consider the limit case of a spillover coe cient, , close to zero. Then R&D would be ine ective in increasing productivity. Y et the decentralized agents would still engage in R&D activity to steal monopoly rents if 0 . Socially, this would be a wastefull allocation of resources. From equations 37 to 40 it appears that the rate of growth of green taxes depresses the equilibrium growth rate of output, and reduces the rate of accumulation of the pollution stock. The level of the green tax rate, h, instead has an impact on the level of aggregate output and emissions, but not on their rates of growth. The analysis of the decentralized economies allows us to understand through which c hannels g h a ects equilibrium growth. Let us therefore have a closer look.
Along the green regime balanced growth path, g h induces the nal sector to reduce progressively the emissions inputs see 15. This depresses output growth directly because one of the inputs is reduced. However, it also implies that the productivity of all other inputs are reduced. So far for the direct consequences, let us now turn to general equilibrium e ects. First, lower demand for labor from the nal sector tends to lower the equilibrium wage, and reduce through this channel the cost of R&D. Also the depressive e ect of g h on the equilibrium interest rate tends to increase the present v alue of the stream of pro ts accruing to patent holders. These two indirect channels increase incentives to R&D activity. It turns out that for " 1 these last general equilibrium e ects dominate, and equilibrium R&D investment increases. The opposite is true if " 1 . The only di erence between the two models, concerning the channels of transmission, runs through this general equilibrium outcome. Indeed only in the VIP, the impact of g h on n e , further a ects incentives to R&D through the creative destruction channel. However, even if R&D increases in equilibrium the rate of growth of output decreases. Therefore, the greater the rate of growth of green taxes, the higher the cumulative loss of output.
Comparing the growth-environment trade-o s.
We h a v e seen that the incentives to engage in R&D in the two economies di er in two main respects. In the VIP with respect to the HIP, the initial pro t of innovators is greater because demand is skewed towards most recent goods. Yet the expected lifetime of monopoly power is shorter. These two features act in opposite directions, and it is not clear a priori which one dominates. We h a v e the following result. Comparing the equilibrium interest rates to the growth rates, this condition implies r e g e Y . But this is necessary for the no-Ponzi game condition, which w e have imposed on households, to hold since assets, W , grow at the same rate of income along a BGP 9 . To prove the second part of the proposition we generalise results obtained in propo- This means that the e ect due to higher initial pro ts dominates the one generated by the shorter lifetime of monopolies, and incentives to engage in R&D are greater in the vertical innovation economy than in the horizontal innovations one.
The following thought experiment might improve the understanding of the result. The property holds because at equilibrium the rate of interest is greater than the growth rate. Consider an exogenous increase in " holding n hence g Y constant. This is equivalent to an increase in r, since the spread is r , g Y = + " , 1g Y . What are the consequences on the R&D arbitrage conditions? The reduction in wages and average pro ts is the same in the two models. Then the only di erence between the two arbitrage conditions, runs through the impact on the denominator of the value of innovations equations 30 and 34. The discount factor is more sensitive t o c hanges in r in the HIP case than in the VIP. T h us incentives to R&D are a ected relatively more in the HIP than in the VIP.
Proposition 6 The equilibrium growth rates of output and stock pollution react more strongly to the growth rate of green taxes in the VIP than in the The rst expression is always smaller than the second in absolute value. The sign of change is positive i f " 1 and negative i f " 1 .
Proposition 7 The rate of growth of green taxes beyond which environmental quality improves is greater in the VIP than in the HIP. That is, de ninĝ g h such that g e S = 0 , we have :ĝ 7 Optimal Policy.
We h a v e three instruments to correct for three distortions. First the capital income subsidy is used to correct for market power in the intermediate goods sector. To set the level of capital or output of the intermediate sector to its socially optimal level, the market price has to match the social marginal cost. The common element of marginal cost is r which will be targeted using the R&D subsidy. Therefore we only have t o imposep = 1 , r= = r in the HIP andp j = 1 , A j r= = A j r in the VIP, which imply HIP = V I P = 1 , .
The task of the green tax is to tackle the optimal level and growth rate of the technological parameter z. As to the otpimal growth rate of the green tax rate we h a v e the following result.
Proposition 8 Proof. We h a v e seen that the decentralized choice of z is such that g e z =
,g h = .
The optimal rate of reduction of z is g o z = g o Y "+!= 1+! by 9. Therefore for the same relationship to hold in the decentralized economy the growth rate of green taxes should be g h = g e Y " + !=1 + !. Substituting 31 for g e Y , and using 12 or 14 we obtain 41.
As to the matter of the optimal level of green taxes, we know that at date T when z is optimally set to unity h T = 1 = 1 + . Date T is de ned by the ratio of the shadow prices of environmental quality and capital T = T = 1=1 + see appendix I. The shadow prices in turn depend on the levels of the stock v ariables.
Let us now turn to the rate of subsidy to R&D.
Proposition 9 Since the equilibrium con gurations of the VIP lie always above those of the HIP, and the schedule shifts upwards with , it is clear that to attain point O in the HIP it is necessary an higher than in the VIP.
It is interesting to notice that under the VIP there exists a theoretical possibility that the optimal subsidy to R&D be negative i.e. a tax. Indeed 42 is always positive but there might be con gurations of parameters such that 1 , 1. T o be in a normal situation 0 the spillover e ect of R&D on general knowledge must be strong enough. 11 As a conclusion we can state that the optimal policy is more expensive under the HIP than under the VIP. Indeed we h a v e seen that h, P, r, , K, w and n are identical in the two cases, yet HIP V I P and from the budget constraint 29, we know that lump-sum taxes will be higher or transfers lower in the HIP than in the VIP. The cost in terms of foregone growth in output is, however, larger in the vertical innovations economy.
Finally, substituting for z in 3 using 15 we can compute the share of green tax revenue over output in the green regime as : . This is the case when the spillover coe cient, , i s v ery small relative to the productivity of labor in R&D, , and growth is positive i n laisser faire although it is not optimal. In this case it is optimal to tax R&D activity because it is not e ective i n fostering average productivity growth.
Which represents a very simple rule for optimal environmental policy: once P o and Y o have been tackled optimally, the government only has to keep real green tax revenue at a level equal to the elasticity of output to emissions inputs. Along the optimal sustainable path of growth, emissions decrease continuously as rms adjust their technology, and the tax rate is increased to o set the depressing e ect on green tax revenue.
8 Conclusion.
In this paper, we h a v e studied and compared two main paradigms of endogenous growth theory in the particular context of sustainable growth when pollution is an implicit input to production. First, we h a v e c hosen two disaggregated economies, with horizontal and vertical di erentiation respectively, and we h a v e shown that they are compatible with the aggregate economy studied by Aghion and Howitt 1998. Then, we h a v e c haracterized the decentralized equilibria of the two economies, introducing three policy tools: subsidies to monopolists and to R&D, and taxes on emissions of pollutants. Along a balanced growth path, subsidies are constant and green taxes increase at a constant rate.
For each model we obtain a continuum of balanced growth paths, highlighting a trade-o between the rate of growth of output and that of the pollution stock. That is, the faster the green taxes grow, the slower is equilibrium growth of output and consumption, but the slower faster the rate at which e n vironmental quality deteriorates improves. We h a v e identi ed the channels through which e n vironmental policy a ects output growth. Some of these channels are direct. First, the policy reduces the growth rate of output by increasing the cost of pollution inputs. Second, it tends to reduce returns to R&D by depressing the demand for intermediate inputs. The other channels are indirect, but in uence the general equilibrium outcome. According to the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, they can dominate the rst direct e ect, and increase incentives to engage in R&D activity.
Comparing the growth-environment trade-o in the two model economies, we h a v e found that all policy tools equal, growth is higher in the vertical innovations economy than in the horizontal innovations one. This result goes beyond environmental issues, and holds because demand is skewed towards innovations in the vertical innovations paradigm, while it is uniform across sectors in the horizontal case.
Finally, w e h a v e obtained the policy tools that allow the social planner to implement the optimal strong sustainable growth path. The optimal subsidy to R&D is greater in the HIP than in the VIP, though the cumulative loss in output growth is more important in the VIP.
The same results hold in the case of tradeable pollution permition see Grimaud, 1998 . Indeed, only the nal sector employes emissions of pollutants as an input in these models. Therefore, a policy that controls the quantity pollution permits is equivalent to one controlling the price green taxes. The equivalence is obtained when the quantity of pollution allowed is such that the equilibrium price of pollution permits on the secondary market matches the green tax rate that we h a v e analysed.
To conclude, we shall signal that we are aware of some caveats and limits of our analysis. First of all, we h a v e not analysed the case of high intertemporal elasticity of substitution " 1 , the dirty-regime, the transition towards the green-regime, and how the policy maker can bring the economy on the sustainable growth path. Then there are two theoretical issues at stake. We h a v e relied on a setting where emissions enter as inputs in the aggregate production function with unitary elasticity of substitution. As shown by Dasgupta and Heal 1974 this is necessary for sustainable growth to be feasible in the presence of essential non-renewable resources. Yet it is not a particularly plausible assumption for corner situations when one of the inputs is close to zero. We also assumed that R&D employs only labor and is not polluting, while letting capital enter the R&D production function would be natural and important 12 . H o w ever, this would limit the scope for sustainable growth because emissions would enter indirectly as inputs of R&D activity, the engine of growth. Finally the law of motion of productivity is given by 12, which is equivalent to 7.
In the VIP the problem is : We can apply this result immediately to derive : 
